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MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF
INTRODUCTION
Since Professor Judith Resnik coined the term “managerial judging”
thirty years ago to describe the expanded role of federal district judges
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, two distinct lines of scholarly
analysis have emerged to discuss judicial management and innovation in
complex civil cases. The first, which predates Resnik and is associated
most closely with a seminal article by Professor Abe Chayes, focuses
attention on the substantive content of constitutional and statutory norms
and the role of the judge following adjudication of the merits in using the
remedial powers of the court to carry those norms into effect. The second,
which has come to occupy a central role in more recent debates over the
judicial function, concerns the earlier phases of the litigation process in
complex cases, when strong direction from the judge and decisions about
scheduling, discovery, joinder, and communication with attorneys can
channel settlement negotiations and shape outcomes. In both discussions,
the figure of the proactive jurist, involved in case management from the
outset of the litigation and attentive throughout the proceedings to the
impact of her decisions on settlement dynamics—a managerial judge—has
displaced the passive umpire as the dominant paradigm in the federal
district courts.1
This bifurcation into two lines of analysis—one concerned with
judicially supervised post-adjudication remedies in public law disputes
and hence implicitly “substantive,” the other focused on pretrial
proceedings in complex litigation and hence implicitly “procedural”—has
obscured the dynamic nature of the relationship that frequently exists
between the mechanisms of litigation and the underlying substantive law.
It is true that the business of judging implicates distinctive institutional
and procedural norms that are worthy of study in their own right. But it is
 Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Institute for Law and
Economic Policy has my thanks for including me in the distinguished conference that gave rise to this
article. Conversations with Steve Burbank, Sam Issacharoff, Arthur Miller, Judith Resnik, David
Shapiro, and Linda Silberman all served to enrich and sharpen my thinking on the matters I explore
here.
1. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).

1027

1028

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:1027

also true that the institutional and procedural norms of the judiciary
interface with controlling liability and regulatory policies in defining the
parameters of litigation. When a federal judge engages in heavy-handed
case management or makes decisions about the proper bounds of a
complex proceeding, it is not just the norms of judging but also the
applicable liability policies that must guide her in that endeavor. Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins2 and the Rules Enabling Act,3 properly understood,
both require such an approach. Professor Robert Cover made this
observation almost forty years ago in a tribute to James Moore, one of the
fathers of the Federal Rules, in terms that the Academy has largely let slip
from its collective memory.
We have become so transfixed by the achievement of James
Wm. Moore and his colleagues in creating, nurturing, expounding
and annotating a great trans-substantive code of procedure that we
often miss the persistent and inevitable tension between procedure
generalized across substantive lines and procedure applied to
implement a particular substantive end. There are, indeed, transsubstantive values which may be expressed, and to some extent
served, by a code of procedure. But there are also demands of
particular substantive objectives which cannot be served except
through the purposeful shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of
process to a case or to an area of law.4
In some cases, controlling liability policies may provide a basis for
arguing that restraint is required in shaping a complex proceeding. Such
was the holding of the Supreme Court in the portion of its Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes5 decision that found the class certified in that case to
violate the requirement of commonality under Rule 23. Although portions
of the Court’s analysis may shape the construction of Rule 23(a) to some
extent in other types of dispute, the commonality holding in Dukes is at
base a statement of Title VII policy. In contrast, the portion of the Court’s
opinion that rejected the use of Rule 23(b)(2) to certify a class of workers
seeking backpay for sex discrimination is primarily about the scope and

2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
4. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975). In an accidental commentary on the Academy’s failure to retain Cover’s
insights here, the Westlaw electronic copy of the publication renders the late scholar’s name as
“Robert M. Covert.” The wisdom in this essay has indeed become a covert presence in discourse about
the judicial function. See id., available at http://www.westlaw.com.
5. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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operation of Rule 23(b)(2) itself—a trans-substantive procedural ruling.
But even that portion of the opinion implicates questions of Title VII
policy in ways that commentary on the opinion has not yet appreciated.
The Court’s fleeting answers to those Title VII questions contributed to its
conclusion that class certification was improper. A more careful focus on
the relationship between Title VII policy and the operation of Rule 23
serves to clarify the Dukes decision and highlights possible grounds for
critiquing and distinguishing the Court’s ruling.
In other cases, the substantive law may affirmatively support judicial
management and procedural innovation. The claims of first responders
injured by the toxic conditions at the site of the September 11, 2001 World
Trade Center disaster offer a prominent example. In a series of targeted
enactments, Congress created a comprehensive scheme for the resolution
of those first-responder claims, specifying a liability rule, preempting
alternative remedies, imposing a collective damages cap, and enacting an
exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the federal court in the Southern District
of New York that resulted in the consolidation of more than 10,000
individual cases before Judge Alvin Hellerstein. In confronting the task of
adjudicating these claims, Judge Hellerstein concluded that the proceeding
before him required that he enforce a standard of fairness and adequacy in
assessing the relief available to claimants, rather than simply treating the
action before him as a standard-issue claims-processing mechanism for
unconnected individuals, and he aggressively managed the litigation in
order to supervise the proposed compensation.6
As the Judge has been frank to admit, some of his actions were
unprecedented. Most notable among these was his rejection of an initial
aggregate settlement in a non-class case, requiring the defendants to
produce more funds and the plaintiffs’ attorneys to give up some of their
fees before he would approve the agreement, even though all the claimants
had signed individual retainer agreements with their attorneys.7 The
proceedings, which are on appeal to the Second Circuit at the time of this
writing, have been the subject of sharp criticism. That criticism has been
misplaced. Judge Hellerstein acted within the proper scope of his authority

6. Judge Hellerstein and his special masters, Professors Henderson and Twerski, provide their
account of the history of that proceeding and the nature of the problems they confronted in Alvin K.
Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Managerial Judging: The 9/11
Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (2012), available at http://www.lawschool.cor
nell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Hellerstein-et-al-final.pdf.
7. See id. at 157–72 (describing the district court’s rejection of the initial settlement and
offering an account of the court’s reasons for believing that such managerial control of the proceeding
was justified).
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in employing such forceful tactics with the litigants before him. His
authority was not that of a generic “managerial judge.” It was the authority
to use case management and procedural innovation as tools for carrying
into effect the distinctive liability policies enacted by Congress in the
comprehensive statutory scheme that defined and limited the relief
available to first responders.
The interplay between procedural mechanisms and underlying liability
policies is evident in more prosaic cases as well. Judges are regularly
called upon to exercise their discretion to shape the boundaries of
litigation within the open-textured provisions of the Federal Rules.
Liability policy can and should guide the judge’s hand in that endeavor.
An emerging issue in the federal district courts concerning ex parte
discovery and the operation of joinder under Rule 20 in online copyright
infringement suits illustrates this common dynamic.
In this Article, I examine the interface between substantive law and
managerial judging. My aim is not to criticize the dominant strain of
current scholarship, with its focus on endogenous values in the practice of
judging. That work has posed important questions that have properly
captured the attention of Academy, Bar and Bench. It is rather to ground
that ongoing discussion in a richer account of the role that substantive
legal policy can and should play in defining the role of the judge,
constraining judicial options in some cases, and legitimizing judicial
initiative in others.
I. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN THE BUSINESS OF JUDGING
Commentators on the importance of procedure in substantive law
reform frequently advert to a noted passage from Karl Llewellyn’s The
Bramble Bush: “You must read each substantive course, so to speak,
through the spectacles of the procedure. For what substantive law says
should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure says that you
can make real.”8 Less frequently remarked upon is the procedural context
in which Llewellyn was writing. The essays that make up The Bramble
Bush were written between 1929 and 1930,9 prior to the enactment of the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and during a pocket of time when efforts at
federal procedural reform appeared moribund.10 The Conformity Act still

8. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 11 (2008).
9. See id. at xxiii.
10. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1089–94
(1982).
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governed, requiring a federal court presiding over an action at law to
conform its procedures in most respects to those employed by the courts of
the state where it was located. Those procedures, in turn, ranged from the
traditional forms of action still utilized in some states, where the
boundaries of the lawsuit as defined through joinder and pleadings derived
from the inherent nature of the rights being prosecuted (and also were
hampered by vestigial and inefficient anomalies), to variations on the Field
Code, which aimed to codify procedure into an internally coherent system
but produced unsatisfying and uneven results. Indeed, New York, where
the Field Code originated and where Llewellyn taught, was notorious as
one of the most troubled among the Code states, with its early reform
efforts having metastasized to become “‘an overgrown mass of detail.’”11
The unpredictable and variable nature of civil practice in the United States
during this period was acute. As a realist commentary upon the role of
procedure, Llewellyn’s remark was concerned more with the sheer ability
of claimants to survive the litigation process than with the relationship
between regulatory policy and judicial process.12
The procedural reform movement that produced the Enabling Act and
the Federal Rules sought to create uniformity in place of this disorder and
an adjudicatory system that would facilitate rather than frustrate
substantive legal policies. Professor Robert Bone, describing the late
nineteenth-century conceptual traditions out of which this reform
movement arose, explains the emerging view that “procedure was related
instrumentally to substance. An ideal procedural system had one objective:
to facilitate the crafting of a remedy ideally suited to redress the
infringement of right and thus to restore the social ideal to a condition of
equilibrium.”13 This conceptual tradition only benefited from the transition
in the early twentieth-century from a natural law account of rights and
remedies to a positive account of law and policy. In the wake of that
transition, Bone asserts, “[m]odern legal discourse is so deeply linked to a

11. See id. at 1042, 1045–46 (quoting Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and
Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 34 A.B.A. REP. 578,
596 (1909)).
12. Professor Llewellyn conveys some of that procedural atmosphere in text preceding his
famous maxim:
The lawyer’s slip in etiquette is the client’s ruin. From this angle I say procedural regulations
are the door, and the only door, to make real what is laid down by substantive law. Procedural
regulations enter into and condition all substantive law’s becoming actual when there is a
dispute.
Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 11.
13. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1989).
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vision of procedure as instrumental to a distinct body of substantive law
that it is often difficult to imagine other possibilities.”14 The Rules
Enabling Act provides doctrinal grounding for this proposition when it
formalizes the subordinate status of practice and procedure to “substantive
rights” in defining the scope of the rulemakers’ authority.15
A countervailing trend has also emerged, however, one that is captured
by the contemporary emphasis on the trans-substantive nature of federal
procedure. In its most basic application, the term “trans-substantive”
simply describes a fact about the Federal Rules, reiterated recently by
Professor Resnik, that “[u]nlike workers’ compensation, the [1937] New
York banking law [at issue in the Mullane case], and the FLSA, the 1930s
Federal Rules crafted a trans-substantive set of procedures to be applied
regardless of the kind of lawsuit (contract, tort, patent, federal statutory
right) or the form of relief (damages or injunction).”16 In discussions of
procedural reform, the principle of trans-substantivity has also performed a
political function, serving at times to deflect targeted efforts to accomplish
social ends through the mechanism of procedure. Thus Professor Paul
Carrington, recapitulating some of the history described above, recounts
the tenor of his experience in 1985 while serving as Reporter to the
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules, when the committee reluctantly
embraced greater transparency and public participation in the rulemaking
process, a reform accomplished largely as a consequence of the scholarly
critiques of Professor Stephen Burbank. Carrington writes:
The structure of the rulemaking process was designed to
encourage the making of transsubtantive rules. . . . Those who
designed and enacted the 1934 Rules Enabling Act did not suppose
that a procedure equally suited to all kinds of cases could be
devised, but if special rules for a substantive category of cases were
needed, their creation would be a task for Congress. Meanwhile,
until such a special need should appear, a politically unaccountable
group should work to serve the broad aims . . . stated in [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1]. Or so it was thought.
But after assessing the situation on the ground in 1985, it seemed
to the Advisory Committee unlikely that continued resistance to
open meetings would succeed. Procedural rules have substantive

14. Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) & (b) (2012).
16. Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 140–41 (2011).
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consequences, and the 1985 Advisory Committee felt that those
affected by a change in the rules should be heard.17
Professor Carrington captures two related dynamics in this account of
the 1985 reform debate. First, the Rules process has long been informed
by the belief that the rulemakers should not craft procedures specifically
designed for particular causes of action. This first proposition tends to
reinforce the mindset that the underlying substantive law should not
inform the operation of the Federal Rules—a distinct issue, and one that
does not follow from the principle of trans-substantivity, but the two have
evolved to convergence nonetheless.18 Second, trans-substantivity focuses
attention upon the practices and procedures of judging as matters with
“substantive consequences” that are nonetheless separate and distinct from
any substantive legal regime—a proposition that reflects a core of truth but
that once again reinforces an artificial separation between procedure and
substantive policy and has the capacity to hobble effective analysis.
Professor Llewellyn’s enduring maxim has thus accommodated a range
of meanings. When first issued, his words in The Bramble Bush served as
a commentary on the desperate need for unifying and simplifying
procedural reforms. Since then, his admonition has been used to
emphasize the independent norms of judicial management to the exclusion
of careful attention to the underlying substantive law. In the analysis that
follows, I suggest an alternative.
II. LIABILITY POLICY AS A PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINT:
WAL-MART V. DUKES
I begin by exploring the role that the underlying substantive law can
play in constraining a judge’s managerial options in a complex

17. Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60
DUKE L.J. 597, 617–18 (2010).
18. The separation-of-powers questions surrounding this aspect of the Rules Enabling Act will
not be my focus in this Article, but it bears noting that this account of the Act’s limitations—that “if
special rules for a substantive category of cases were needed, their creation would be a task for
Congress,” id.—is in tension with the Supersession Clause and its seeming grant of authority to the
rulemakers to supplant congressionally enacted procedures, including those targeted to particular
substantive categories of cases. Professor Burbank wrote in a similar vein when commenting on
Professor Carrington’s approach to the Enabling Act shortly after the reforms described above,
explaining: “I believe that, under the original Enabling Act, the restrictions on court rulemaking
should have been read to effect the purpose of allocating federal lawmaking power of the legislative
type, not just to protect existing law, and certainly not just to protect state law.” Stephen B. Burbank,
Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules
Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1019.
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proceeding, using Wal-Mart v. Dukes19 as an illustrative case. Dukes has
been received as a watershed, with academic commentators treating the
Court’s holdings on commonality and on Rule 23(b)(2) as paradigmshifting statements of class-action policy. There is no question that Dukes
is a consequential case. But the academy has been too quick to assign the
opinion broad trans-substantive meaning. The Court’s discussion of the
commonality issue in Dukes is grounded in Title VII policy and speaks
primarily to the federal common law of disparate impact remedies under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The handful of statements on Rule 23 and
commonality play only an equivocal role in the analysis. The Court’s
treatment of Rule 23(b)(2), in contrast, does speak to core questions of
class-action policy. Even so, the substantive policies underlying the
dispute played a major role in the Court’s determination that a (b)(2)
action was unavailable, albeit a role that the Court itself left largely
unexplored. The constraints that Dukes imposes upon class-action practice
are inextricably tied to a series of express and implied holdings under Title
VII and should be approached with that substantive focus in mind.
Wal-Mart v. Dukes presented the Court with the largest proposed class
action ever attempted under Title VII. Wal-Mart, the Nation’s largest
private employer, stood accused of utilizing a nationwide management
policy that consistently imposed a disparate impact upon female workers.
The policy reposed broad discretion in store-level managers to employ
their own “subjective criteria” in matters of hiring, advancement and
termination of employees, and the plaintiffs claimed that such discretion
produced a male-dominated workplace hostile to female employees.
Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of current and former female
employees who had been subject to these policies, numbering about one
and a half million in total, claiming injunctive and declaratory relief,
backpay, and punitive damages on behalf of the class. The district court
certified the class and the en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the
requirements of Rule 23(a) were satisfied and that the action could
proceed under Rule 23(b)(2) as a class seeking “final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief . . . respecting the class as whole,” with
the request for backpay characterized as incidental to the non-monetary
relief.20
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that divided 5–4 in one part
and was unanimous in another. The Court divided on whether the

19. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
20. Id. at 2547–50.
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plaintiffs’ action satisfied the requirement of commonality under Rule
23(a), with the majority finding that Wal-Mart’s policy of reposing
discretion in store-level managers did not create a sufficiently common
issue for class certification. Speaking unanimously, the Court found that
Rule 23(b)(2) was not an appropriate vehicle for certifying a class that
sought individual backpay awards or individualized injunctions to
reinstate particular employees. Commentators and lower federal courts
have given the decision active attention in the year since it was rendered.21
It is thus important to have a clear understanding of the elements of the
Court’s ruling and the sources of authority from which they spring.
Turning first to the divided portion of the opinion that speaks to Rule
23(a), there are at least two components of the Court’s commonality
analysis that can properly be termed pure questions of Rule 23 policy.
First, in describing how cohesive a common issue must be among class
members—and how dispositive the resolution of that issue must be to their
claims—the Court adopts a formulation from Professor Richard Nagareda
that focuses on the presence of “dissimilarities” within the suit and
emphasizes “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation” rather than merely
raising common questions.22 Second, in discussing the evidentiary burden
borne by the party seeking certification, the Court offers a strong
statement of the plaintiff’s obligation to show affirmatively that Rule 23 is
satisfied through the introduction of evidence that “convincingly
establishes” its requirements.23 Both aspects of the Court’s holding have
trans-substantive procedural impact. The one offers a formulation of
commonality that may tighten certification analysis in future cases
regardless of the substantive legal regime involved; the other sets a
generally applicable evidentiary condition at the threshold of class
certification. But the primary significance of the Court’s commonality
analysis in Dukes relates to Title VII.
Commonality analysis requires a court to examine the nature of the
putative class claims asserted by the plaintiffs and the elements of proof

21. A Westlaw KeyCite request on the opinion performed on June 27, 2012 returned over 500
reported court decisions citing to Dukes and well over 1,000 secondary sources.
22. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–51 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131–32 (2009) (italics in original)). As Justice Ginsburg
correctly notes in her partial dissent, the quoted material is taken from a portion of Professor
Nagareda’s article in which he has referenced, and appears still to be discussing, the requirement of
predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 2565–66 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
23. Id. at 2551–52, 2554.
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necessary to establish those claims. Questions of Rule 23 policy—in
Dukes, whether a court should require only common questions or instead
examine “the capacity of a proceeding to generate common answers apt to
drive the resolution of the litigation”—must be coupled with questions of
liability policy—what type of showing will establish liability in a Title VII
disparate impact case, and what type of evidence is competent to make
that showing?
After its recitation of the Rule 23 standard, the Dukes Court offers an
answer to those questions that sounds entirely in Title VII policy. The core
of the class proceeding in Dukes was a company-wide policy,
implemented by Wal-Mart in all of its stores, that reposed discretion on
matters of hiring and promotion in store-level managers. Plaintiffs argued
that the policy imposed a disparate impact upon women in its overall
effect upon company personnel, whether by reinforcing unconscious bias
among managers, masking acts of intentional discrimination, or making
advancement within the workplace dependent upon social dynamics that
disadvantaged women. The common question, and it was undeniably
“common,” was the nature and extent of the effects imposed by that
company-wide policy and whether those effects constituted actionable
harms. The “capacity of [the] proceeding to generate common answers apt
to drive the resolution of the litigation” depended upon the operative
significance, under the controlling liability regime, of the features of the
policy that were common to the entire company.
The Court framed its commonality analysis with these principles,
flagging the precise nature of the claimed harm under Title VII as its
starting point:
Title VII . . . can be violated in many ways—by intentional
discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in
disparate impact, and by the use of these practices on the part of
many different superiors in a single company. Quite obviously, the
mere claim by employees of the same company that they have
suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII
injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can
productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a
common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory
bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention,
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide
resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity
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will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the
claims in one stroke.24
After reviewing the record from the certification hearing, the Court
concluded that the evidence did not support the existence of a policy that
was potentially actionable under Title VII and common to the entire class.
The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence
convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s ‘‘policy’’ of allowing
discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. On its
face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment
practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class
action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices.
It is also a very common and presumptively reasonable way of
doing business—one that we have said ‘‘should itself raise no
inference of discriminatory conduct.”
To be sure, we have recognized that, ‘‘in appropriate cases,’’
giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title
VII liability under a disparate-impact theory—since ‘‘an employer’s
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking [can have]
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible
intentional discrimination.’’ But the recognition that this type of
Title VII claim ‘‘can’’ exist does not lead to the conclusion that
every employee in a company using a system of discretion has such
a claim in common. To the contrary, left to their own devices most
managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a
corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sexneutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that
produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose to reward
various attributes that produce disparate impact—such as scores on
general aptitude tests or educational achievements. And still other
managers may be guilty of intentional discrimination that produces
a sex-based disparity. In such a company, demonstrating the
invalidity of one manager’s use of discretion will do nothing to
demonstrate the invalidity of another’s. A party seeking to certify a
nationwide class will be unable to show that all the employees’ Title

24. Id. at 2551.
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VII claims will in fact depend on the answers to common
questions.25
The Court’s confidence about what most companies and managers
would surely do if left to their own devices may provoke skepticism, and
the merits of its Title VII analysis may be subject to debate. What is
important for present purposes is to recognize that it is in fact Title VII
policy that drives the Court’s analysis. If Wal-Mart had an express policy
that encouraged stores to prioritize men over women in hiring and
promotion, that policy would itself violate Title VII and be subject to a
common, classwide injunctive remedy. This is true even if, “left to their
own devices,” many managers would disregard the policy’s
encouragement and make decisions based purely on merit. Such a policy
would embody intentional discrimination in defining the opportunities
available to prospective employees, and that suffices to make out a Title
VII claim on a common basis.26 Just so, if the company had a policy that
favored workers with greater height and upper-body strength in positions
where those characteristics have no occupational justification, the policy
would be subject to a common, classwide injunctive remedy for its
unjustified disparate impact, even if many managers would disregard the
policy and instead “select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for
hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.” Once
again, the express policy produces a disparate impact sufficient to warrant
injunctive intervention under Title VII.27
Thus, the Court’s holding does not speak primarily to the content of
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Rather, that holding sounds in the
liability policies of Title VII. If the Court had found that a company-wide
policy of reposing discretion in store-level managers could support a Title
VII injunction because of its capacity to impose a disparate impact upon
women, regardless of how that policy plays out in particular stores—just
as the express preference and height-and-weight examples described above
could violate Title VII for their intentional discrimination and disparate

25. Id. at 2554 (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (“[I]n enacting Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which
create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex,
or national origin.”).
27. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1977) (holding that height and weight
restrictions that disproportionately exclude female employees “establish a prima facie case for
discrimination” if “the facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly
discriminatory pattern” and disavowing any “requirement . . . that a statistical showing of
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants”).
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effects, even in the face of store-level idiosyncrasy and variation—then the
fact of the discretionary policy would itself have constituted a common
issue, as “all the employees’ Title VII claims [would] in fact depend on
the answers to common questions.”28 The Court’s holding that such a
claim could not be certified against Wal-Mart on a company-wide basis
constituted a pronouncement on the content of Title VII’s liability rule—
the circumstances in which a discretionary policy will or will not support a
finding of disparate impact—and spoke to the commonality requirement of
Rule 23 in only a derivative fashion.
The Court’s analysis of Rule 23(b)(2) and individually tailored
remedies, in contrast, sounds primarily in the policies of Rule 23 itself. It
is a trans-substantive procedural ruling. Even so, substantive liability
policy does play an indirect role in the Court’s analysis. But the Court
leaves that role largely unexplicated.
In the part of its opinion that speaks unanimously, the Court rejects
Rule 23(b)(2) as a vehicle for certifying claims for backpay under Title
VII. Disapproving the more expansive uses to which some lower federal
courts have put that provision, the Dukes Court limits the reach of Rule
23(b)(2) to cases in which “a single injunction or declaratory judgment
would provide relief to each member of the class” and holds it to be
unavailable “when each individual class member would be entitled to a
different injunction or declaratory judgment” or “would be entitled to an
individualized award of monetary damages.”29 The Court leaves open the
question whether (b)(2) could be used in cases where claims for injunctive
or declaratory relief “predominated” over paired claims for monetary
damages, though it indicates strong disapproval of such hybrid actions and
makes clear that their ambit would be narrow in any event.30

28. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
29. Id. at 2557 (italics in original).
30. Id. at 2559–61. Unfortunately, the Court also repeats the Shutts fallacy, citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), for the proposition that “[i]n the context of a class
action predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due
process.” Id. at 2559. Shutts decided no such thing. The Court’s 1985 ruling answered a question about
state adjudicatory power: whether a state court may entertain a nationwide class action involving
absent class members with no prior connection to the forum. The Court answered in the affirmative on
the strength of the individual notice and opt-out opportunities required by state law, concluding that
class members who declined to opt out had manifested sufficient consent to be bound by the forum. In
a suit where the adjudicatory reach of the court is not in question, this holding has no direct
application, and the Court has held in another seminal opinion, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, that
individual damages claims can sometimes be compromised in a representative proceeding with no
individualized notice or opt-out opportunity. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). I explore these issues at length in
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class
Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2076–80 (2008).
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In contrast to its discussion of commonality, the Court’s analysis in this
section of its opinion is concerned almost entirely with Rule 23 itself. The
Court discusses the history and origins of Rule 23 as a lens through which
to scrutinize the proper function of subsection (b)(2).31 It explains that the
text and procedural policies bound up in subsection (b)(2) would be
frustrated by allowing its use for the certification of individual damages
claims, as it refers to “injunctive relief” that is “appropriate respecting the
class as a whole.”32 And it points to the coordinate features of a 23(b)(3)
class action that are designed to safeguard the interests of class members
when individual damages claims are in play, concluding that the integrity
of the Rule would be subverted if subsection (b)(2) could be pressed into
service to certify claims for individualized monetary damages without the
operation of those safeguards.33
These pronouncements upon Rule 23(b)(2) do not depend upon the
particularities of the claims sought to be certified. They speak in a transsubstantive fashion to the structure, purpose and operation of the Rule and
the process values of notice, litigant autonomy, and opportunity to be
heard that are addressed in the Rule’s respective provisions. There should
be no doubt about the lasting significance of that part of the Court’s
holding to class action litigation across different substantive legal
contexts.34
Nonetheless, there is one portion of the Court’s holding that does
depend upon an assessment of liability policy under Title VII. The Court
correctly links this part of its Rule 23 analysis to the Rules Enabling Act,
but it fails to provide an adequate account of the underlying substantive
law.
Having concluded that Rule 23(b)(2) is only available in cases
involving requests for relief that can readily be crafted on behalf of the
class as a whole, rather than relief that must be individually tailored to
each class member, the Court holds that requests for backpay under Title
VII do not satisfy that requirement. Under the statute’s remedial
provisions, the Court explains, “Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized
determinations of each employee’s eligibility for backpay”—specifically,
the opportunity to show as to each employee “that it took an adverse

31. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–58.
32. Id. at 2557.
33. Id. at 2558–59.
34. Professor Jack Coffee emphasized the relative importance of the Court’s 23(b)(2) holding in
an early response to the decision. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future (if Any) of Class Litigation After
‘Wal-Mart,’ NAT’L L.J., Sept. 12, 2011.
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employment action against [the] employee for any reason other than
discrimination.”35 The Ninth Circuit had approved the use of a samplebased approach to resolve these defenses, under which “[t]he percentage
of claims determined to be valid would . . . be applied to the entire
remaining class, and the number of (presumptively) valid claims thus
derived would be multiplied by the average backpay award in the sample
set to arrive at the entire class recovery” without the need for
individualized determinations in each case.36 Rejecting this form of “Trial
by Formula,” the Court found that a district court was not empowered to
administer Title VII claims in a manner that altered the defendant’s ability
to litigate statutory defenses employee by employee, even in cases
involving huge numbers of claims where so many individual hearings
would be impractical. Treating the question as one of procedure versus
substance, the Court proclaimed: “Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids
interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’
a class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be
entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”37
The Court is correct to say that the Rules Enabling Act would forbid a
court from relying upon Rule 23 as the source of its authority in crafting a
class proceeding that would substantially modify the rights that the parties
would enjoy in a purely individual case. But the Court is incorrect in
concluding that the holding in Dukes necessarily flows from that premise.
There is another source of authority that could take into account the larger
litigation context—a huge number of claimants, and the impracticality of
providing relief without some form of aggregate proceeding—in
determining whether it is appropriate to structure a class action in which
the defendant’s ability to assert individual defenses as to each claimant is
altered: the underlying substantive law itself.
Professor Burbank and I addressed a related issue in our analysis of
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance,38 a diversity
case in which the Court found Rule 23 to preempt a New York statute,
CPLR § 901(b), that forbade class actions for causes of action affording
statutory or penalty damages unless the statute creating the cause of action
specifically authorized classwide relief. Justice Scalia’s lead opinion is
highly formalistic, relying upon the unconvincing proposition that class
certification has only an “incidental” effect on the dynamics of litigation

35.
36.
37.
38.

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2560–61.
Id. at 2561.
Id. (citations omitted).
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
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and settlement as the basis for its conclusion that Rule 23 presents no
problems under the Enabling Act so long as the formal elements of the
underlying cause of action remain unchanged in a class action.39 As we
explained in that earlier article, it seems likely that “the majority simply
could not see a way to uphold the facial validity of Rule 23 while at the
same time acknowledging the industry-changing impact of class action
practice.”40 But it is not necessary to retreat to a land of fancy to preserve
Rule 23 within the Enabling Act structure.
The solution to the seeming dilemma caused by Rule 23’s dramatic
impact upon substantive liability and regulatory regimes is that Rule
23 is not the source of the aggregate-liability policies that generate
that impact, and it never has been. Rather, courts must look to the
substantive liability and regulatory regimes of state and federal law
in determining whether aggregate relief is appropriate and
consistent with the goals of that underlying law. Rule 23 is merely
the mechanism for carrying an aggregate proceeding into effect
when the underlying law supports that result. It is an important
mechanism, and one that makes its own controlling policy choices
for the federal courts about such matters as notice, opportunity to
opt out, and immediate appeal of certification. But Rule 23 does not
set policy on the propriety of aggregate remedies as a means of
accomplishing regulatory goals—and it could not possibly do so.41
In Shady Grove, the plurality argued that a Federal Rule could preempt
any state liability or regulatory policy that was enforced through a
mechanism that utilized “procedural” language. The majority comprising
Justice Stevens and the four Ginsburg dissenters, however, recognized that
liability policies are sometimes bound up with mechanisms that look
procedural in form. The result in the case hinged upon Justice Stevens’s
conclusion that CPLR § 901(b) was not such a provision.42

39. Id. at 1443 (Scalia, J., for himself and Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.).
40. Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 65 (2010).
41. Id. at 21.
42. It is unfortunately the case that the Ginsburg/Stevens majority discussed these issues
exclusively in terms of state substantive policies, perpetuating the fallacy that the limitations of the
Rules Enabling Act are particularly directed to state law and federalism values, rather than applying
equally to federal question cases and primarily implicating separation-of-powers concerns, see Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449–50 (“It is important to observe that the balance Congress has struck turns, in
part, on the nature of the state law that is being displaced by a federal rule.”) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment), though Justice Ginsburg was more careful to specify that this
way of framing the issue obtains only in diversity cases, see id. at 1460–64. For a discussion of these
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In Dukes, the Rule 23(b)(2) question presents an analytical mirrorimage of the question presented in Shady Grove. Rule 23 is a procedural
mechanism constrained by the Enabling Act. Title VII embodies a set of
regulatory and liability policies regarding discrimination in the workplace.
Having concluded that plaintiffs seeking certification cannot proceed
under section (b)(2) when each class member’s claim would require an
individualized remedy, the Court correctly turns to Title VII to determine
whether the liability policies embodied in the statute could accommodate
that requirement. Thereafter, however, the Court’s opinion suffers from
inadequate analysis.
The Court concludes that it would be inconsistent with the liability
policies reflected in Title VII to permit the resolution of backpay claims
without giving Wal-Mart an opportunity to raise individualized defenses to
the claims of each absentee. It relies for that conclusion upon two sources
of authority. First, the Court points to the statute itself, which creates an
affirmative defense for employers who can demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for taking adverse employment action. The statutory
text, however, does not specify the form or method of that defense. The
provision is directed only to the permissible scope of a court’s order:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of
an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement,
or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to
him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement
or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.43
The Court then points to its own statements in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States44 (which in turn rely upon McDonnell

matters, including an account of the differing roles that federal courts play as expositors of common
law in difficult Rules Enabling Act cases when proceeding in diversity versus federal question
jurisdiction, see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 48–51.
The Dukes decision offers an implicit corrective to this misframing of the Enabling Act when it
invokes the Act as a limitation on the range of interpretations that are permissible for Rule 23(b)(2) in
that case, since Dukes is a federal statutory dispute in which only federal substantive rights are
threatened with abridgment or modification. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32. The Court
does not flag the issue for particular attention, but the invocation of the Enabling Act is significant
nonetheless as a counterweight to the frequent occasions on which the Court has implied that the Act is
primarily aimed at safeguarding federalism values. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
43. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A).
44. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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Douglas Corp. v. Green45 and Franks46) to describe the “procedure[s] for
trying pattern-or-practice cases that give[] effect to these statutory
requirements,” procedures that provide an opportunity for the defendant to
“raise any individual affirmative defenses it may have”47 against each
claimant for separate adjudication.
Teamsters, McDonnell Douglas, and Franks—and now Dukes—are
federal common-law rulings. In each case, the Court has taken portions of
a regulatory statute that do not specify the methods of evaluating proof or
administering remedies and set forth a body of judge-made law designed
to carry into effect the express provisions of the statute and the policies
underlying them. At the very least, the rulings are robust interstitial federal
common law, filling in gaps in the statute that Congress must have
contemplated the courts would go on to specify. But they also constitute
affirmative statements of policy by the federal courts, making substantive
decisions within the framework Congress set forth about the balance
between reasonable opportunities for plaintiff recovery, on the one hand,
and protection of defendants from unwarranted liability or settlement
pressure, on the other. And the Court has been attentive to the impact of
Rule 23 upon those competing priorities when setting federal policy for
Title VII class actions.
In Franks, for example, the Court broadened the forms of class-wide
relief available to employees seeking vested status in a seniority system as
part of the remedy required to make them whole for past acts of racial
discrimination. Citing portions of a Conference Committee report
attending the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the Court noted the report’s
enjoinder that courts “‘fashion the most complete relief possible’” and
found in it “emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to
fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to
effect restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial

45. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas introduced the burden-shifting framework by
which a Title VII claimant can make out a prima facie case of discrimination and then shift the burden
to the employer to identify a neutral reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 802–04. It also
validated the use of “statistics as to [a company’s] employment policy and practice” as a means of
determining whether a refusal to hire a particular job applicant “conformed to a general pattern of
discrimination against blacks,” though the Court cautioned that, in an action brought by an individual
claimant, “general determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an
individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for
refusing to rehire.” Id. at 804–05 & n.19.
46. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
47. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
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discrimination in hiring.”48 The Court responded to the charge that
classwide seniority relief could result in unfair burdens upon innocent
employees whose seniority would thereby be lessened by emphasizing that
“[a]ttainment of a great national policy . . . must not be confined within
narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in
ordinary private controversies.”49 Validating the propriety of “class-based
seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal hiring discrimination,” the
Court reserved the possibility that “[c]ircumstances peculiar to the
individual case may, of course, justify the modification or withholding of
seniority relief,” but only when such exceptions were recognized “for
reasons that would not if applied generally undermine the purposes of
Title VII.”50
Franks speaks not only to the availability of a particular remedy under
Title VII (inclusion in a seniority system) but the administration of that
remedy on a class-wide basis and the resulting impact upon the purposes
underlying Title VII. In a similar fashion, lower federal courts have
grappled with the question whether an individual non-class plaintiff in a
workplace discrimination case can proceed on a Teamsters pattern-orpractice theory, in which the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by
showing “that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or
policy followed by an employer or group of employers.”51 Some courts
have found that this method of proof is available to private litigants only
on a class-wide basis,52 while others permit individual plaintiffs to rely
upon pattern-or-practice statistical methods provided that they are
sufficiently probative of the reasons underlying the adverse employment
action.53 In both cases, one sees what Professor Burbank and I have
described as “the application of Rule 23 [serving as] the occasion for the
Court to implement class action policies in federal common law that it was

48. Franks, 424 U.S. at 763–64 (quoting SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 1746,
OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 CONFERENCE REPORT, 118

ACCOMPANYING THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972)).

49. Id. at 777–78 (citations and quotations omitted).
50. Id. at 779–80.
51. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
52. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 Fed. Appx. 707, 716–17 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding
that “the pattern-or-practice method should be reserved for government actions or plaintiffs in class
actions to establish the presence of a discriminatory policy, rather than an individual claim”); Lowery
v. Circuit City, 158 F.3d 742, 759–64 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting pattern-or-practice method in
individual Title VII case).
53. See, e.g., Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 766–67 (3d Cir. 1989) (permitting use
of pattern-or-practice style statistical evidence and explaining that “in individual disparate treatment
cases such as this, statistical evidence . . . need not be so finely tuned” because the claim does not
depend upon demonstrating “systemic employment practices”) (citation omitted).
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otherwise authorized to make”54—whether the federal court is
implementing the substantive federal policies mobilized by a statute like
Title VII, or utilizing their authority as independent tribunals to articulate
rules on such matters as the tolling of a limitations period as in American
Pipe55 or a rule of preclusion as in Cooper.56
In Dukes, the Court fails to address the significance of the aggregate
litigation context in assessing the content and operation of these federal
common-law policies. Wal-Mart v. Dukes presented claims of nationwide
scope brought against the country’s largest private employer, alleging a
pattern of substantial harm to female employees as a consequence of the
employer’s decision to eschew objective standards for hiring and
promotion across the company. It is possible that the purposes underlying
Title VII could only be faithfully carried into effect in such a case through
a nationwide class proceeding that was comprehensive in scope. Insofar as
Title VII aims to provide relief to workers who have suffered harm as a
result of discriminatory practices, and also to force employers to
internalize the actual harm caused by past wrongs, a nationwide
proceeding might provide the only practical and economically viable path
in response to a pervasive but inchoate policy in a massive national
company. And insofar as Title VII aims to eliminate discriminatory
practices prospectively, a proceeding that scrutinizes that policy and crafts
relief on a company-wide basis may be a necessary tool. At least, so the
plaintiffs argued, and those arguments cannot be dismissed out of hand.
If clear statutory text requires individualized assessments that would
make a nationwide class action impossible to certify, then a federal
common law response is foreclosed. Section 706(g)’s references to the
“reinstatement of an individual” and an affirmative defense if adverse
action toward “such individual” was non-discriminatory might require
individual hearings and foreclose a (b)(2) class action. But there is room
for disagreement about just how clear a mandate is imposed by the text
alone. If, instead, prior rulings about the requirement for individualized
hearings are the product of federal common law building upon
indeterminate statutory language, then a case like Wal-Mart v. Dukes
provides an occasion for revisiting those federal common law rulings

54. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 50.
55. American Pipe & Constr. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (establishing tolling rule for putative
class members in actions filed under Rule 23).
56. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (setting preclusion rule for
individual claimants in Title VII discrimination case following unsuccessful prosecution of a pattern or
practice claim on a classwide basis).
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rather than merely applying them to deny relief. The balance struck in
prior cases between reasonable opportunities for recovery by plaintiffs and
protection of defendants from unwarranted liability have proceeded from a
set of assumptions about litigation dynamics and industry conditions. If
those assumptions do not obtain in a new commercial context, then the
same authority that gave rise to the Teamsters framework in the first place
could require reexamination.57
In such a case, the aggregate litigation context would matter to some
aspects of the parties’ claims and remedies. This is not because Rule 23
mandates a reexamination of Title VII policy—it does not, and cannot
under the Enabling Act—but rather because the underlying liability
policies themselves call for that reexamination. As Professor Kaplan
explained when addressing an analogous analytical question relating to
subject-matter jurisdiction in class actions, “[l]ike other innovations from
time to time introduced into the Civil Rules, those as to class actions
change the total situation on which the statutes and theories regarding
subject matter jurisdiction are brought to bear.”58 Both circumstances
evince what Professor Burbank and I have called the “tension between the
limits of the Enabling Act and the power of the Federal Rules to shape or
catalyze developments in the underlying law.”59
I do not argue here that such alterations to the federal common law of
remedies under Title VII were warranted in Dukes, or that the Court’s
ultimate holding regarding the availability of certification under Rule
23(b)(2) was incorrect. A proper treatment of those questions exceeds the
scope of this Article. But it is these questions that the Court should have
addressed in the second half of its analysis. The constraints on class action
practice that Dukes imposes are defined by the interplay between Rule 23
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Whether those constraints represent
good policy or bad under that landmark statute, they are largely substancespecific and should be recognized as such.

57. Professor Sherry makes a similar observation in her discussion of Dukes, expressing
skepticism at the plaintiffs’ underlying substantive goals. See Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered
at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26–27 (“I suggest that . . . [the plaintiffs’] decision to
proceed as a class action in Wal-Mart can be explained as a desire to change the substantive law of
employment discrimination. The allegation of a culture of discrimination was essentially an attempt to
write into Title VII the concepts of structural discrimination and implicit bias. . . . But such a theory
distorts Title VII beyond recognition.”).
58. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 399–400 (1967).
59. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 56.
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III. LIABILITY POLICY AS AFFIRMATIVE AUTHORITY FOR MANAGERIAL
JUDGING: THE 9/11 FIRST-RESPONDERS LITIGATION
The underlying substantive law need not operate only as a constraint
upon procedural options in a complex case. The liability policies
governing a dispute can sometimes authorize, or even demand, a
managerial role on the part of the trial court. This is true in class litigation,
where the underlying substantive law can take account of the importance
of aggregate relief in defining the rights of parties if authoritative policymakers so decide, as in the scenario involving Title VII and Rule 23(b)(2)
described above. And it is also true in non-class litigation, including the
increasingly important phenomenon of mass-tort aggregation.
The current generation of scholarship on aggregate litigation typically
draws a sharp distinction between class actions and non-class aggregate
proceedings. Particularly with respect to review of proposed settlements
for adequacy or fairness, the governing assumption, reflected in the
American Law Institute’s Principles on Complex Litigation, is that the
Rule 23 mandate requiring judicial approval of settlements marks class
actions as a qualitatively different type of proceeding, conferring authority
upon judges that is unavailable in non-class cases.60 This analytical
mindset overstates both the power and the singularity of Rule 23. Rule 23
is a muscular provision that places important tools in the hands of district
judges, but those tools can only be employed when they are consistent
with the liability policies of the governing substantive law. By the same
token, the Federal Rules are not the only source of authority that a judge

60. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
(2010). The ALI Principles begin with the assumption that judicial approval of settlements is only
required in class action proceedings, see id. § 3.01(a)–(b), emphasize that “[s]ignificant differences
between class and non-class cases require that these two types of cases be treated differently for
purposes of settlement,” id. § 3.15, and then set forth a set of conditions that should be met for an
aggregate settlement to be enforceable but assign “[r]esponsibility for compliance with the
prerequisites for the enforceability of [such] an agreement” to “the claimants’ lawyer.” Id. § 3.17(f). It
is of course true that there are differences between these types of proceedings that require close
attention, but the ALI’s sharply categorical treatment of these distinctions is noteworthy. See also
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265
(2011) (developing argument that individual party consent must be the touchstone for the types of
judicial management and supervision that characterizes class litigation).
Professor Robert Bone is one important exception to this scholarly trend. Bone recently penned a
critique of the sharp doctrinal demarcations often attributed to the divide between class and non-class
proceedings, though his main focus was preclusion doctrine and the analytical foundations of his
critique were quite different from those I explore here. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of
Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 577 (2011).
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can draw upon when called to carry into effect the liability policies
underlying a complex dispute.
The consolidated proceedings overseen by Judge Alvin Hellerstein in
the 9/11 first-responders litigation dramatically illustrate the role of the
substantive law in authorizing management and innovation by a district
judge beyond that expressly contemplated by the Federal Rules. It is
possible that the singular nature of the statutory framework governing the
proceedings before Judge Hellerstein will limit the immediate precedential
impact of his rulings. Even if so, the distinctive features of that statutory
framework provide a rich opportunity for challenging the artificial lines of
separation typically drawn between the role of the judge in a class action
and in non-class proceedings.
The first-responders litigation arose as part of the federal government’s
multi-stage response to the death and injury wrought by the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. The use of hijacked commercial airliners
as weapons of mass destruction posed an existential threat to the U.S.
airline industry, which faced the prospect of incalculable liability for the
harm done by the attacks themselves and a crisis in public confidence in
the safety and viability of air travel. Congress responded by enacting a
statutory scheme, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act,61 or ATSSSA, to protect the airline industry from bankruptcy and to
provide compensation to the injured survivors of the attacks and the
families of deceased victims.
The most well known component of ATSSSA, the Victim
Compensation Fund or VCF, set up a no-fault system overseen by special
master Kenneth Feinberg that enabled eligible beneficiaries to receive
compensation for their harm in return for agreeing to waive the right to sue
in tort.62 As originally structured, the VCF covered individuals who were
killed or physically injured in the attacks or in their “immediate
aftermath,” a designation that extended no more than 96 hours after the
crashes occurred.63

61. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).
62. See id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (providing that individuals who submit a claim under the VCF
thereby waive the right to file a civil action in any U.S. court for damages sustained as a result of the
air crashes).
63. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re
World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining scope and operation of VCF and
related provisions of ATSSSA).
Ken Feinberg provides an indispensable account of his experience administering the VCF in
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT?: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL
UPHEAVAL 41–62 (2012).
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Individuals who suffered physical injury as a result of the attacks but
who were not present within 96 hours of the crashes, including many
rescue and response personnel who began work outside that window of
time, were not eligible for participation in the no-fault VCF. Their tort
claims posed potentially serious threats to the airline industry, the City of
New York, and the owners of the World Trade Center property site where
rebuilding would need to occur. ATSSSA thus extended the liability
protections it provided those defendants to cover such claims as well, even
though the injured parties would not have the opportunity to participate in
the no-fault compensation scheme. In lieu of a compensation fund,
ATSSSA permitted these claims to proceed in tort, but subject to extensive
and coordinated regulation. The first-responders litigation was the
resulting proceeding in which these claims were adjudicated.64
To govern the first-responder claims, ATSSSA created exclusive
remedy provisions, imposed caps on total damages, and established
specialized rules for jurisdiction and venue—a set of provisions that were
comprehensive in scope and preemptive in effect. Far from being just
another mass tort multidistrict litigation that happened to arise in a
singular factual context, the first-responders litigation was the product of a
targeted statute containing substantive aggregate liability policies. Those
policies must be considered as a whole to appreciate their full import:
Exclusive Federal Cause of Action: ATSSSA created a federal cause of
action that preempted all other state and federal provisions as “the
exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent
crashes of [the 9/11] flights.”65 This federal cause of action incorporated
state law by reference as a standard in defining the liability rule, but it did
so with the caveat that any such law not be “inconsistent with or
preempted by Federal law.”66
Caps on Liability: Under ATSSSA’s exclusive federal remedy, the
total damages available for all claimants against airlines and airports,
aircraft manufacturers, or persons with a property interest in the World
Trade Center were capped at “the limits of liability insurance coverage
maintained by” those entities;67 and the total damages for all claimants
against the City of New York were capped at three hundred and fifty

64. See Hellerstein et al., supra note 6, at 132–42 (describing the series of decisions by which the
district court came to define the scope of the proceeding it would hear, the terms of eligibility for
participating in that proceeding, and the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed).
65. ATSSSA § 408(b)(1).
66. Id. § 408(b)(2).
67. Id. § 408(a)(1).
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million dollars (or the city’s insurance coverage, if that number was
greater).68 Any damages claimed against the specified defendants that
exceed these levels were extinguished.
Mandatory Jurisdiction and Venue: Having created a limited fund from
which all claimants seeking an adjudicatory remedy must pursue their
claims, the statute required that every claim be heard before a single court,
ensuring that the entirety of the first-responders litigation would be heard
as a comprehensive consolidated action: “The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim . . . resulting from or
relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”69
Although the statute did not specify that all claims must be heard before
the same judge, that eventuality was easy to predict in light of established
MDL practice, which favors the consolidation of related complex claims
before a single transferee judge.70 In this connection, one should note the
different treatment that choice of law and jurisdiction receive under
ATSSSA. Although the statute permits different state laws to apply as the
point of reference for liability in each first-responder case, selecting the
law that the state of each respective crash site would apply (subject to
preemption or inconsistency with federal law), it mandates that all claims
be heard in the Southern District of New York, emphasizing the
importance that ATSSSA attached to coordination. The statute contains a
targeted directive for a consolidated proceeding for all September 11
claims.
This comprehensive set of statutory provisions necessarily called for an
approach to the management and adjudication of the first-responder claims
that prioritized the overall fairness of recovery and the allocation of
benefits among claimants as a controlling principle in the litigation.
ATSSSA forged a substantive legal relationship among the first
responders. The ability of any one claimant to recover was dependent upon
the amount obtained by others from the limited fund, and a lack of

68. Id. § 408(a)(3).
69. Id. § 408(b)(3). The “resulting from or relating to” language is broad, apparently intending to
extend to the fullest extent possible under Article III in sweeping claims relating to the September 11
attacks into the Southern District of New York.
70. While the MDL statute speaks of transfer to “a judge or judges,” ordinary practice since the
statute’s inception has been to transfer cases to a single transferee judge. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b); see,
e.g., Hon. Andrew A. Caffrey, The Role of the Transferee Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 69 F.R.D.
289 (1976) (remarks of Chief Judge Caffrey at a meeting of transferee judges, referring passim to
individual transferee judges as the recipients of MDL cases). I have conducted recent conversations
with members of the MDL panel that have been to the same effect.
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coordination in the award and timing of individual recoveries or
settlements could have compromised the ability of some responders to
recover at all if the limited fund was exhausted prematurely. Such
circumstances have long been recognized as justifying the type of judicial
supervision mandated in the class-action setting by Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and
its correlative provisions. In this case, ATSSSA created those
circumstances as a matter of targeted liability policy, not simply the
application of a general liability rule to an unusual factual scenario.
The first-responder claims were not a class proceeding. They were not
governed by Rule 23. But Rule 23 does not embody some expressio unius
principle that forecloses a district court from employing its managerial
tools outside the context of a class action, particularly when the
substantive law calls for such judicial supervision. To suggest that the
specification of certain managerial tools under Rule 23 forecloses a district
judge from employing similar tools in non-class cases is to misunderstand
the structure and operation of Rule 23.
In a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action, the requirements for judicial
assessment and approval of any proposed settlement serve a dual function.
They safeguard the interests of absentees who have no voice in the
litigation, a distinct requirement of class litigation. But they also serve to
ensure that the consolidation of claims effectuated by a class proceeding
will not operate to the collective detriment of plaintiffs claiming against a
limited fund. A case involving massive coordination of individual claims
subject to a collective damages cap squarely implicates this second
purpose, even if it does not raise formal concerns about the interests of
absentees. Rule 23 does not purport to occupy the field of judicial
management in consolidated actions when concerns arise over the impact
of consolidation on the rights of claimants in non-class proceedings.
Judge Hellerstein’s federal common law powers provided him with
sufficient authority to take actions aimed at ensuring that the policies
underlying ATSSSA would be given effect through the consolidated
proceeding before him. Those underlying liability policies demanded
compensation that was fairly allocated and adequate in amount for the first
responders claiming under the limited fund. The imperative for fairly
allocated compensation proceeds from ATSSSA’s imposition of a
damages cap and its consolidation of all claims before a single court,
which made the claimants’ ability to recover wholly interdependent and
necessarily called for an allocative approach. And the imperative for
compensation that was adequate in amount reflects the trade-off that
ATSSSA imposed when it capped the damages available to first
responders and extinguished their claims under state law in order to secure

2013]

MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW

1053

the widely distributed public benefit of a financially solvent airline
industry, a healthy New York City, and property owners who were willing
and able to proceed with the reconstruction of the World Trade Center site.
The approach I suggest here—analyzing the managerial powers of a
court in light of the substantive law that governs the dispute before it—
finds ample antecedent in the caselaw. Consider the noted opinion of
Judge Lord in United States v. Reserve Mining Co. concerning requests for
intervention by private and governmental entities in an abatement
proceeding brought by the federal government against a mining company
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.71 The governing statute
required that the court take into account a wide variety of materials
encompassing “such . . . evidence, including that related to the alleged
violation of the [pollution] standards, as it deems necessary” to the
complete resolution of the dispute.72 Given that substantive mandate,
Judge Lord found:
The role of a court [hearing such an abatement suit], because of the
nature of the proceedings and considerations which must be
reviewed and undertaken pursuant to the statute, transcends
ordinary civil litigation and makes a reviewing court more of an
administrative tribunal than a court in an ordinary adversary civil
case.73
Using this principle as his guide, Judge Lord concluded that Rule 24’s
requirement that intervenors-as-of-right show an “interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action”74 must be read
“as an inclusionary rather than exclusionary device” in a Federal Water
Pollution Control Act abatement action.75 Judge Lord’s opinion is cited in
the literature as an example of intervention analysis that properly takes
into account the public-law context of the inquiry.76 In the first-responders

71. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972); see also The Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160 et seq. (repealed 1972). I thank Steve Burbank for
suggesting a discussion of Judge Lord’s opinion.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (repealed 1972).
73. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413.
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). The 2007 restyling of the Rules changed “which” to “that” in the
quoted text.
75. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413.
76. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 328 n.339 (1989). Judge Lord also had distinguished antecedents in this
approach to intervention. In his classic article on the subject, Professor Shapiro emphasized that the
“interest” requirement in Rule 24(a) does not impose a uniform and rigid test but rather must be read
in light of the substantive legal setting and the impact of a proposed intervener on the litigation.
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litigation, the necessity of a substance-specific approach to the district
court’s managerial decisions under ATSSSA was patent.
Nonetheless, the academic and critical commentary of Judge
Hellerstein’s management of the first-responders litigation has been
remarkably inattentive to the statutory framework within which the Judge
was operating. One extensive treatment of the issue in a Seton Hall Law
Review article is illustrative.77 The author, Jeremy Grabill, approaches
judicial review of mass non-class settlements from a libertarian
perspective, identifying litigant autonomy as the value of primary
importance in safeguarding the interests of mass-tort non-absentee
claimants. According to Grabill, individual consent should be the only
basis for a judge to exercise review and approval authority of a settlement
in such a case.78 I disagree with Grabill’s approach, but his analysis is
thoughtful and careful. In crafting his arguments about non-class litigation,
Grabill focuses particular attention on three case studies: the two
pharmaceutical litigations that arose out of alleged injuries from Baycol
and Vioxx, and the 9/11 first-responders litigation. As a point of contrast
to these cases, Grabill provides an overview of federal statutory regimes
that expressly require or authorize judicial review of non-class settlements,
including the compromise of claims in federal bankruptcy, environmental
remediation actions under CERCLA, and employment claims under the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act.79 Throughout his discussion of litigation
practice under these statutory schemes, Grabill focuses attention on the
specific liability policies that require or justify aggressive judicial
management, including approval of settlements.
In his discussion of Baycol, Vioxx, and the first responders, however,
such attention to underlying liability policies is absent. In discussing these
cases, Grabill focuses attention on the absence of the factors that he
believes justify active judicial management in bankruptcy and other

[T]he reference in Rule 24 and in some statutes to an “interest” suggests that the test is a
simple one, but that notion quickly fades when one struggles with the cases. . . . Whether a
sufficient interest exists to make intervention appropriate calls for considerable and careful
judgment, and perhaps a little faith as well, with attention to such factors as the legal and
practical availability of other remedies, the contribution that the prospective intervener can
make to the litigation, the immediacy and degree of the harm threatened, and the advantages
of avoiding multiplicity of actions.
David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 721, 740 (1968).
77. Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 123 (2012).
78. Id. at 127, 163–64.
79. Id. at 130–38.
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proceedings. But when offering an affirmative account of the policies at
stake in his case studies, in particular the first-responders case, Grabill
employs what Judge Posner might call Esperanto liability law80—a
homogenized description of mass-tort liability policy with no attention to
the singular liability-shaping features of ATSSSA:
Though it is a creature of ATSSSA, the World Trade Center
Disaster Site litigation can be thought of as an MDL proceeding, or
perhaps five related mini-MDLs all before the same judge. And just
as in the Baycol and Vioxx litigations, the plaintiffs’ claims in the
World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation were not certified as
class actions, leaving thousands of related cases to proceed
individually.81
Grabill goes on to describe the proposed settlement in the first-responders
litigation as “much like the Vioxx Settlement Agreement” because it
required settling parties to opt in and would take effect only upon
achieving a certain threshold of participation.82 He pays no attention to the
liability framework created by ATSSSA, which preempted alternative
remedies, capped the aggregate liability available to all claimants, and
imposed a caveat that federal interests not be undermined when
incorporating state tort law as a rule of decision.
Whatever merit one attaches to off-the-rack arguments about the
autonomy that litigants retain in an MDL proceeding in which claimants
are pursuing their individual claims free from any formal constraints on
recovery—and there is good reason to approach those arguments
skeptically, given the limited nature of the attorney-client relationship in
many mass cases, the pressure on claimants to accept prefabricated
settlements, and the power of attorneys in a management committee to
shape the course of the proceedings—such arguments carry much less
force when the autonomy of litigants has been altered by a liability regime
that formally transforms the resolution of their claims into an exercise in
allocation.
The same principles call for some critical attention to Judge Jack
Weinstein’s opinion in the Zyprexa pharmaceutical litigation, which

80. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1995).
81. Grabill, supra note 77, at 147. See also Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the
Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 321–22 (2011) (describing the consolidated first-responders’ litigation as a
mere Rule 42 proceeding and disregarding the jurisdiction and venue provisions of ATSSSA).
82. Grabill, supra note 77, at 149–50.
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contains one of the leading judicial statements of a quasi-class theory in
justifying court supervision of mass aggregate litigation.83 The Zyprexa
dispute involved claims that a drug used to treat schizophrenia produced
weight gain and elevated blood-sugar levels as side effects, increasing the
risk of diabetes. A large number of individual cases were consolidated
before Judge Weinstein by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
whereupon the Judge appointed five special masters, one tasked with
overseeing discovery and four (one of whom was Kenneth Feinberg) with
facilitating settlement. After a little over a year, the efforts of this team
produced a settlement consisting of a three-track claims-administration
structure that covered about 8,000 plaintiffs. On the matter of fees and
expenses, the Judge instructed the settlement special masters to “consult
with each other and the parties and recommend to the court a fee schedule
providing for allocation of expenses and a reasonable attorney’s fee,”
using as the measure of reasonableness “the lesser of the maximum
reasonable general fee schedule” recommended by the special masters
themselves, “the fee agreed upon between the client and the attorney in an
individual case, and the maximum amount permitted under the applicable
local state rules and statutes.”84 Upon receiving the recommendation of the
special masters, the Judge made a slight alteration that reduced the
percentage cap on contingency fees and gave the special masters discretion
to make further adjustments up or down in individual cases.85
On the issue of attorney’s fees, there is authority supporting the power
of judges to engage in supervisory review to ensure that the attorneys who
appear before them do not use the processes of the court in an unethical
manner to extract excessive or coercive fees from the parties they
represent. Judge Weinstein discusses those authorities in his order
reducing the negotiated fees, and his account of the fee negotiations—
which saw some attorneys seeking forty percent contingencies from their
clients—suggests that supervision on that issue may indeed have been
warranted.86 But rather than rely solely upon that more limited species of

83. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Zyprexa
II].
84. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Zyprexa
I].
85. Zyprexa II, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 490–491.
86. Professor Ratner raises legitimate questions concerning the applicability of the authorities
cited in Zyprexa to an MDL proceeding. See Morris A. Ratner, Achieving Procedural Goals Through
Indirection: The Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate
Settlements, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2013). As Ratner points out, the authorities upon which
Judge Weinstein and several of his MDL colleagues have relied in supervising contingency awards
generally “involved highly-contextualized and case-specific court supervision of attorneys’ fees, where
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power, the Judge begins his analysis with a broader theory of the
supervisory role of courts in non-class aggregate cases:
While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private
agreement between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has
many of the characteristics of a class action and may be properly
characterized as a quasi-class action subject to general equitable
powers of the court. The large number of plaintiffs subject to the
same settlement matrix approved by the court; the utilization of
special masters appointed by the court to control discovery and to
assist in reaching and administering a settlement; the court's order
for a huge escrow fund; and other interventions by the court, reflect
a degree of court control supporting its imposition of fiduciary
standards to ensure fair treatment to all parties and counsel
regarding fees and expenses.
No one except the trial judge, assisted by special masters, can
exercise this ethical control of fees effectively. Many of the
individual plaintiffs are both mentally and physically ill and are
largely without power or knowledge to negotiate fair fees;
plaintiffs’ counsel have a built-in conflict of interest; and the
defendant is buying peace and is generally disinterested in how the
fund is divided so long as it does not jeopardize the settlement.87
This strong statement of the quasi-class theory could equally be used to
justify judicial supervision and approval of all the terms of a mass action
settlement, not merely the details of attorney compensation, as leading
commentators were quick to recognize.88
Judge Weinstein’s articulation of the quasi-class theory in Zyprexa is a
statement of judicial authority in a purely “procedural” mode, in several
respects. First, Judge Weinstein makes no reference to the liability policies
underlying the dispute, instead relying upon features of the suit—a large
number of claimants with limited ability to participate or negotiate with

the plaintiffs were legally incompetent . . . or where court intervention in fee issues was attendant to
either the award of statutory fees . . . or to the creation of a common fund as part of a class action
settlement.” Id. at 76. At the very least, Ratner argues, a more fully realized justification is required to
extend these precedents to MDL proceedings. This critique is well taken, but for present purposes, it
suffices to observe that such debates still center on the status of MDL parties and the ethical
responsibilities of the court, rather than the more far-reaching theory of the quasi-class that Judge
Weinstein chose to rely upon in Zyprexa.
87. Id. at 491–92. See also Zyprexa I, 233 F.R.D. at 122–23.
88. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
214–15.
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counsel and the imperfect alignment of incentives—to which he ascribes
trans-substantive significance. Second, the Judge points to his own earlier
managerial decisions, creating a “degree of court control” in the
proceeding, as a justification for his Rule 23-style supervision of proposed
settlements, an argument that might be vulnerable to a charge of analytical
bootstrapping, although the federal policies underlying the MDL statute
itself might go some way toward answering those criticisms. The Judge’s
lack of attention to underlying liability policies in this broad statement of
principle is worthy of particular note in light of his discussion of
attorney’s fees, where he looks to state and federal authorities as sources
of underlying policy guidance.89
My purpose here is not to argue that a trans-substantive account of the
judicial function is inadequate to support the type of managerial power
that Judge Weinstein exercised in Zyprexa. Some scholars have made that
case,90 although I am more convinced by the work of others who have
examined the dynamics of mass adjudication in the courtroom, in attorneyclient relations, and in the economics of litigation and concluded that such
proceedings raise serious questions about the absence of judicial
supervision and the need to protect vulnerable claimants, even if the transsubstantive authority of judges to address these needs remains contested.91
My purpose here is more limited: to juxtapose Zyprexa with the World
Trade Center first-responders litigation and invite a comparison with the
more specific grounding that the underlying liability policies provided to
Judge Hellerstein’s rulings.
Judge Weinstein relies upon a set of general observations about the
practical dynamics of mass consolidation to justify the use of tools like the
MDL statute and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16, 26, 42 and 53 to
shape policy outcomes. These are indeed powerful tools, and the MDL
statute in particular has received inadequate attention as a source of federal
law on important matters of litigation policy. But these sources of
authority say nothing about the policies that should govern the actual
outcomes produced by a managerial process. Rather, it is the liability

89. Zyprexa II, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 492–96.
90. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1769 (2005) (discussing controls on aggregate settlement in terms of individual consent and the
ethical rules of lawyer-client relations and conflicts of interest, rather than judicial supervision).
91. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of
Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 585 (2006) (arguing that the
paradigm of individual client relations, notice, and litigant autonomy is inadequate to protect the
interests of claimants in non-class mass aggregate proceedings).
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policies underlying a mass dispute that must dictate outcomes.92 As
Professor Burbank and I have explained in discussing the role of a judge
overseeing a complex proceeding in federal diversity court:
Sometimes, federal common law will be required to implement
federal interests reflected in valid federal law, including the Rules
themselves. Where this is so, state law will be displaced.
Sometimes, however, the federal common law analysis will fail to
unearth interests that are demonstrably rooted in existing federal
law. In the latter class of cases, the limitations on federal common
law in diversity litigation will often require that state law control the
analysis because no valid federal interests requiring protection exist
to displace it.93
Just as Rule 23 has sometimes served as “the occasion for the Court to
implement class action policies in federal common law that it was
otherwise authorized to make,”94 governing such matters as the tolling of
statutes of limitation or the preclusive effect of a judgment, so can the
rules governing mass consolidations in federal court serve as the occasion
for implementing managerial litigation policies that fall within a federal
court’s independent common-law authority: promoting the reliability and
factual accuracy of the proceedings and ensuring that the interests of
claimants are not compromised through neglect, faithless behavior, or
iatrogenic effects created by the very initiation of a consolidated action.
But when it comes to determining the adequacy of a global settlement or
the propriety of trade-offs reflected in the allocation of damages among
claimants, the judge must look to the underlying law, be it state or federal,
for guidance.95 In such a case, the underlying liability policies define the

92. Professors Silver and Miller set forth an alternative approach to the quasi-class model that
seeks to improve the incentive structures of lawyers and the court itself to produce good outcomes for
claimants. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). The authors point
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as a model for their approach, although they do not
offer a fully elaborated justification for the importation of the PSLRA’s approach into disputes
governed by different substantive legal regimes (that is, outside the securities law context).
93. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 26–27.
94. Id. at 50.
95. This is true even in the case of class actions subject to Rule 23(e)(2)’s requirement that
settlements only be approved upon a finding that the result is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” The
measure of fairness and adequacy must be taken against the underlying liability policies, and those
policies fall outside a federal judge’s common law authority in a diversity case. Justice Ginsburg
makes the same basic point in her opinion for the Court in Gasperini when describing the standard
against which a Rule 59 motion for new trial based upon excessive damages must be measured. See
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996) (“It is indeed ‘Hornbook’ law

1060

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:1027

point of reference for claimant outcomes and shape the authority of the
judge to manage the proceedings in service of those ends.
IV. LIABILITY POLICY AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES: THE SWARM-DOWNLOAD COPYRIGHT CASES
The underlying substantive law can also influence the more quotidian
aspects of a lawsuit. Trial judges have broad discretion in their
administration of many of the procedural doctrines that shape civil actions.
We typically discuss those doctrines in endogenous terms, with judges
seeking to maximize such procedural values as the efficient management
of their dockets, the avoidance of unnecessary litigation burdens on parties
and witnesses, and the fair, accurate and expedient resolution of claims.
This focus is appropriate and indeed required by the rules themselves,
most prominently in the case of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which
admonishes that the Federal Rules “be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”96 But such endogenous concerns need not be a judge’s only
point of reference when making discretionary procedural rulings. It is
equally appropriate for a judge to consider the potential impact of a ruling
on the liability policies bound up in the substantive law when exercising
procedural latitude.97 A series of procedural copyright rulings now
percolating up through the federal district courts provides an apt
illustration.
The cases giving rise to these rulings involve claims brought by the
owners of sexually-explicit movies seeking to prevent online violations of
their copyright perpetrated through bit-torrent or swarm downloading. A
swarm download is a technique by which a large electronic file is
downloaded in pieces from multiple sources in parallel and the pieces then
reassembled into a complete whole. The technique will often enable users
to download files much more quickly. Picture information on the Internet
as water flowing through various rivers, streams, and rivulets. If a user
that a most usual ground for a Rule 59 motion is that ‘the damages are excessive.’ Whether damages
are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law. And there is no candidate for that
governance other than the law that gives rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of New York.”)
(citations omitted).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
97. The leading academic commentary on the exercise of discretion under the Federal Rules
remains Judge Friendly’s classic article. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31
EMORY L.J. 747 (1982). Judge Friendly offers an indispensable account of judicial process values in
discussing the administration of discretionary doctrines, but he leaves unexplored the role of
substantive liability policy in shaping judicial discretion.
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downloads a file through a single pathway, then the download speed is
limited by the smallest rivulet in that pathway. But if the user can
download many pieces of the file from multiple different sources, then he
can overcome the drag caused by the small rivulets, stacking them together
in parallel and enabling much more data to flow in a short period of time.
A user who downloads a file using swarm technology can then become a
new source for future swarm downloads. In such a case, the file is kept on
the user’s computer in a manner that makes it accessible as a download
source for future swarms.
Swarms have been used aggressively to download sexually-explicit
movies, perhaps because the technique enables users to acquire the films
anonymously (and, obviously, for free). Owners of these movies seeking
to protect their copyright encounter two related challenges. The first
involves the identification of the alleged perpetrators. Because the swarm
is anonymous, copyright owners are typically able to identify only the IP
address of the source that participated in the swarm.98 The tools of
discovery can assist copyright holders by empowering them to subpoena
information from Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), which keep records
of the identities of IP address holders, though many ISPs purge that
information periodically, limiting the window of time during which
alleged perpetrators could be identified. The second problem arises from
the sheer number of alleged perpetrators. Swarm downloading is a form of
distributed copyright violation. There is not a single, readily suable entity
that is responsible for each violation. Rather, hundreds, or thousands, of
individual users make up the ad hoc group responsible for the hundreds, or
thousands, of violations. These users typically do not know each other and
have no relationship other than their anonymously shared file swarms.
In response to these problems, copyright holders have adopted
aggressive litigation strategies in seeking to pursue civil remedies. Relying
upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, they have attempted to join
alleged violators as anonymous “Doe” defendants in large numbers,
sometimes in the thousands and frequently in the hundreds, identifying
them only by the IP addresses used in illegal swarm downloads. And
relying upon Rule 26(d), they have asked district courts to permit them to
take third-party discovery from ISPs prior to the Rule 26(f) conference of
the parties, so that they can learn the identities of the IP address holders
and serve them individually in the lawsuit. Dozens of district courts

98. An IP or Internet Protocol address is a number that uniquely identifies a location to or from
which data is transmitted. Thus, for example, the cable modem or wireless router attached to a typical
home computer has an IP address that locates it for the rest of the world.
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around the country have rendered opinions in these disputes, and they
have varied widely in their responses.
The case for some form of pre-conference discovery is strong in these
disputes. The plaintiffs allege facts that, if true, would constitute violations
of their copyright, and subpoenaing records from ISPs is the only tool by
which they might be able to identify the alleged perpetrators. The tool is
not a perfect one. ISP records will only give the identity of the subscriber
who has paid for a given Internet account. They will not indicate who was
using the account at the time of the swarm download. So, if a teenager
uses his parent’s Internet account to participate in a swarm, or a college
student uses his roommate’s account—or, for that matter, if a user
participates in a swarm through a publicly-available wireless site—the ISP
records will identify someone other than the perpetrator and may wind up
giving little useful information. Courts have noted that some copyright
holders might send aggressive settlement demands to account holders after
obtaining discovery from ISPs, despite the uncertainty around whether a
given account holder is the actual perpetrator, pressuring potentially
innocent individuals into settling for nuisance value. Courts are right to be
concerned about such tactics, which they can address through orders that
limit the use that plaintiffs can make of information obtained from ISPs
and the circumstances and manner in which they may contact account
holders.99 But some kind of pre-conference discovery appears necessary to
enable plaintiffs to identify the defendants they wish to sue.
The more difficult question is what type of action plaintiffs should be
permitted to assemble when they seek to enforce their copyright in swarm
download cases. Rule 20(a) provides that defendants “may be joined in
one action as defendants” if claims are asserted against them “with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences” that share common questions of law or fact.100
Trial courts have wide discretion in shaping the boundaries of a civil
action in their administration of Rule 20 and Rule 21, which empowers the
Court “at any time, on just terms, [to] add or drop a party.”101 Two
questions thus present themselves in these cases. First, is joinder possible
under Rule 20—do the proposed defendants satisfy the threshold

99. See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 244–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (crafting
an order designed to protect account holders from premature disclosure or exploitation of identifying
information).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
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requirements of the rule? Second, is joinder advisable under Rule 20—
should the court permit it?102
The swarm download cases clearly satisfy the requirement of a
common issue of law or fact: the law applicable to the violation of the
plaintiff’s copyright and many of the factual circumstances surrounding a
particular swarm will be common to all defendants. The transaction-orseries-of-transactions requirement is more debatable, and district courts
have differed in their analysis. One leading opinion found that
it is difficult to see how . . . a series of individuals connecting either
directly with each other or as part of a chain or ‘swarm’ of
connectivity designed to illegally copy and share the exact same
copyrighted file . . . could not constitute a “series of transactions or
occurrences,” for purposes of Rule 20(a),103
while others have held that this requirement is defeated by the lack of any
relationship among swarm participants and the distribution of swarm
activity across time (swarm activity around a given file can sometimes last
for months) and digital geography.104
Threshold questions about the boundaries of a transaction or
occurrence determine whether joinder is available at all. As to that

102. It bears noting that the decision of the Supreme Court in Shady Grove creates the possibility
of an alternate construction of Rule 20 by viewing the permissive language of the Rule (parties “may
join” or “may be joined”) as granting discretion to the parties in deciding how to structure their suits
but none to the trial court, which must permit joinder whenever the threshold requirements of the Rule
are satisfied. Shady Grove relied upon such a reading of Rule 23 to reject the efforts of the lower
federal courts in that case to give effect to New York CPLR § 901(b). See Shady Grove Orthopedic
Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (2010).
Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly empowers a federal court ‘to
certify a class in each and every case’ where the Rule’s criteria are met. But that is exactly
what Rule 23 does: It says that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied ‘[a] class action
may be maintained’ (emphasis added)—not ‘a class action may be permitted.’ Courts do not
maintain actions; litigants do. The discretion suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is discretion
residing in the plaintiff: He may bring his claim in a class action if he wishes.
Id. This portion of the analysis in Shady Grove is probably not sustainable. For present purposes, it
suffices to observe that the syntactical differences between Rule 20 and Rule 23, coupled with the
control mechanism of Rule 21, should defeat any attempt to apply Shady Grove’s rigid interpretation
of Rule 23 to the joinder of individual parties.
103. Digital Sin, 279 F.R.D. at 244.
104. See, e.g., Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–131, 280 F.R.D. 493, 498 (D. Ariz. 2012)
(“[T]here is no logic to segregating the Arizona based members of the swarm from the non-Arizona
based members, except Plaintiff's convenience. The Court finds this is not a basis for allowing
permissive joinder.”); AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–97, No. C-11-03067-CW (DMR), 2011 WL
2912909, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (finding that the “fundamental constraint” imposed by
BitTorrent protocol “on the collaboration between copyright infringers” precludes Rule 20(a)(2)(A)
from being satisfied).
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question, the district court’s analysis in Digital Sin seems the most
appropriate. As with the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, the
threshold requirements of permissive joinder set the outer boundaries for
the types of civil action that are possible, and permissive joinder is
discretionary, meaning that a liberal approach does not impose a de facto
rule mandating more complicated lawsuits. Thus, Judge Nathan is correct
to rely upon the Court’s statement in United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs105 that “the impulse [under the Federal Rules] is toward entertaining
the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties;
joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”106 The
sentiment is an appropriate one for defining the parameters of Rule 20.
This approach is also consistent with the treatment of Rule 20 that
Professors James, Hazard and Leubsdorf provide in their treatise, which
conceptualizes the series-of-transactions requirement as a reflection of
underlying liability policies. When “completely independent acts converge
to cause an injury, for all or for some part of which the actors have a
common liability under substantive law,” the cases have generally
concluded that the transaction test is satisfied, and James et al. embrace
that result.107
The question whether joinder is advisable in these cases, and hence
whether the district court should exercise its discretion to permit it,
requires broader thinking about the sources of law that should influence
the court’s decision. The impact of massive party joinder on the dynamics
of litigation is one major consideration. Thus, Judge Teilborg in the
District of Arizona denied a plaintiff’s request to join 131 individual
swarm defendants out of concern for the impact on the litigation, detailing
the many ways in which “allowing this case to proceed against 131
Defendants creates more management problems than it promotes

105. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
106. Id. at 724.
107. FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE
563–64 (5th ed. 2001). My thanks to Steve Burbank for drawing my attention to this treatment of Rule
20.
The authors go on to question the result in Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F.
Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959), a rare and much-noted instance of a court finding the transaction test not
satisfied. Plaintiff Insull asserted libel claims against three unrelated defendants for statements they
made over a three-year period, and the district court found the claims too separate in time and
circumstance to satisfy the transaction or occurrence requirement. While acknowledging that this result
is “not wholly untenable,” the authors question why “a common liability for the same damage” should
permit joinder of multiple defendants “but not a liability for separate but similar damage inflicted on
the same plaintiff at the same time,” particularly when the latter circumstance “involve[s] great
overlapping of proof” and common questions about the proper measure of damages for each. James et
al., supra, at 564–65.
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efficiency.”108 These are concerns arising from Rule 20 itself and clearly
require attention. Indeed, taking into account such litigation concerns in a
request for massive individual joinder operates as a complement to Rule
23(a)(1), which permits a class action to proceed only when “the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”109 If the
impracticality of joining numerous individuals is one requirement for
entertaining a representative action, it is obviously a justification for
denying excessive joinder in a proposed individual action.
But Professor Cover reminds us that “there are also demands of
particular substantive objectives which cannot be served except through
the purposeful shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of process to a case or to
an area of law.”110 What impact will permitting or denying massive joinder
have upon the underlying liability policies in these cases? That question,
too, can and should guide a district court’s exercise of its discretion under
Rule 20, even after it finds that the threshold requirements of the rule are
satisfied. In the swarm download cases, at least two countervailing
considerations are at work. There is the threat that denying joinder would
frustrate the goals of the underlying law. Judge Nathan indicates her
awareness of this concern when she notes that denying joinder might
“introduce significant obstacles in plaintiffs’ efforts to protect their
copyrights from illegal file-sharers” in part because “requiring aggrieved
parties to file hundreds or even thousands of separate copyright
infringement actions” would entail the payment of hundreds or even
thousands of individual filing fees at $350 per action.111 Conversely,
massive joinder and pre-conference discovery carry with them the danger
of abusive settlement practices and misdirected enforcement. Several
courts have noted the danger that copyright holders will “send settlement
demands to the individuals whom the ISP identified as the IP subscriber”

108. Third Degree Films, 280 F.R.D. at 498.
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
110. Cover, supra note 4, at 718.
111. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 244 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quotation and
alterations omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (2012) (requiring “parties instituting any civil action . . . to pay
a filing fee of $350”). Judge Howell relies upon a similar concern in permitting broad joinder and preconference discovery in a case involving over 5,000 total defendants, writing:
If the Court were to consider severance at this juncture, plaintiffs would face significant
obstacles in their efforts to protect their copyrights from illegal file-sharers and this would
only needlessly delay their cases. The plaintiffs would be forced to file 5,583 separate
lawsuits, in which they would then move to issue separate subpoenas to ISPs for each
defendant's identifying information. Plaintiffs would additionally be forced to pay the Court
separate filing fees in each of these cases, which would further limit their ability to protect
their legal rights.
Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (D.D.C. 2011).
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despite the possibility that the subscriber may not be the alleged infringer,
and indeed that mass joinder combined with pre-conference discovery
would particularly lend itself to this practice.112 “That individual—whether
guilty of copyright infringement or not—would then have to decide
whether to pay money to retain legal assistance to fight the claim that he
or she illegally downloaded sexually explicit materials.”113 Given the
discomfort or awkwardness that many people would feel in having their
names associated with a sexually-explicit film, the danger of abusive or
misdirected enforcement is acute.
These concerns operate at the juncture between procedure and
substance, and district courts must attend to both good case-management
practice and liability policy in resolving these disputes. Thus, when Judge
Nathan permitted the plaintiff in Digital Sin to obtain pre-conference
discovery against 176 Doe defendants, she crafted an order designed to
prevent abusive settlement tactics that required the ISPs to perform an
intermediary role, serving the subpoena upon the account holders
identified via IP address but preserving their anonymity during a safe
harbor period in which they could contest the subpoena or move to
proceed anonymously.114 No less an authority on civil practice than Judge
Lee Rosenthal has given her imprimatur to this approach, adopting Judge
Nathan’s order in a swarm download case before her court.115
This way of proceeding imposes costs upon the ISPs, which are
required to become active participants in the early stages of the lawsuit
with a primary role in administering discovery requests and facilitating
challenges brought by subscribers. There is no question that, as a general
matter, the provisions for third-party practice encompass the possibility of
such costs: Rule 45 admonishes district courts to avoid “undue burden” in
issuing subpoenas, contemplating that some burdens might be necessary in
third-party discovery practice.116 But what justifies the imposition of such
costs in this class of cases?

112. SBO Pictures Inc. v. Does 1–3036, No. 11-4220 (SC), 2011 WL 6002620, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 30, 2011).
113. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–130, No. C-11-3826 (DMR), 2011 WL 5573960, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011).
114. Digital Sin, 279 F.R.D. at 244–45.
115. See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–59, No. H-12-0699, 2012 WL 1096117, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 30, 2012).
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1), stating that
A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps
to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. The issuing
court must enforce this duty and impose an appropriate sanction—which may include lost
earnings and reasonable attorney's fees—on a party or attorney who fails to comply.

2013]

MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW

1067

The answer follows from the underlying liability policies. ISPs provide
a service that has high social utility, offering widespread access to the
Internet and permitting users to explore the web anonymously. But ISPs
also impose social costs, facilitating the unauthorized copying of protected
materials in violation of copyright law.117 The policies underlying the law
of copyright speak to this trade-off. If the distributed and anonymous
nature of swarm downloads creates the danger of widespread copyright
violations with no remedy, then copyright policy suggests that the
businesses selling the service that facilitates those violations should also
have to bear the costs associated with facilitating a remedy.
In a different type of dispute—one where the values and activities
protected by the underlying law were not threatened in a singular fashion
and where the burdened third party was not also a participant in
undermining those protected values—this assessment of costs and burdens
might well play out differently. The rules on joinder and third-party
discovery offer the tools for judges to use in adjudicating such disputes,
and they define threshold conditions that must be satisfied for those tools
to be available. Trans-substantive procedural values like efficiency,
fairness to parties in the processing of their claims, and the manageability
of the resulting proceedings all inform the analysis. But, in appropriate
cases, the goals of the substantive law must also play a role in assessing
the allocation of costs and burdens among the litigants.
This discussion of joinder in swarm-download disputes should sound
unremarkable—an assessment of litigation dynamics and policy impacts
of a type that courts make all the time. It draws together procedural and
substantive values in a manner that is both appropriate and unavoidable
when setting the metes and bounds of civil disputes. That same amalgam
of procedural and substantive values characterizes large questions like the
shape of class action practice under Title VII and extraordinary cases like
the 9/11 first-responders proceeding. And yet the role of liability policy in
defining and shaping the parameters of litigation in all these settings
seldom receives the attention it requires.

117. For present purposes, I adopt a simplistic description of social costs and copyright: the law of
copyright seeks to prevent unauthorized copying of protected material, and anonymous Internet access
facilitates that unauthorized copying. I leave unexplored larger questions concerning the level of
constraint that is desirable in copyright enforcement; whether the net value added to copyrighted
material by the open architecture of the Internet offsets any costs that result from unauthorized
copying; and whether copyright itself is a viable paradigm in electronic media. A deeper examination
of these factors might influence the discovery analysis.
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CONCLUSION
The explosion of interest in the role of judges over the last thirty years
has produced valuable insights into the institutional responsibilities and
limitations of the judiciary. The increasing demands that litigants have
placed upon the civil justice system make such discussions of the judicial
function ever more salient, with class actions, mass tort adjudication, and
the MDL process bringing important regulatory matters within the
compass of private adjudication. But these insights have come at a cost. In
focusing so much attention on the craft of judging, we have gotten out of
the habit of discussing complex-litigation dynamics—both the prosaic and
the extraordinary—in light of the underlying substantive law.
Writing in 1975, near the beginning of what we now identify as the
threshold of the modern era of managerial judging and complex litigation,
Professor Cover foresaw the danger that the growing power of our uniform
and trans-substantive procedural code might crowd out proper
consideration of underlying substantive values.
Professor Moore's great achievement—the continued viability,
efficacy and, indeed, excellence of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—seems all the more remarkable when one realizes that
the river of litigation constantly erodes the architecture of processoriented codes, leaving us with its case law incidents of application.
It is extraordinary that our legal system holds a divided view of
procedure: Our norms for minimal process, expressed in the
constitutional rubric of procedural due process, are generally
conceded to constitute a substance-sensitive calibrated continuum in
which the nature of the process due is connected to the nature of the
substantive interest to be vindicated; yet our primary set of norms
for optimal procedure, the procedure available in our courts of
general jurisdiction, is assumed to be largely invariant with
substance. It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural
needs of a complex antitrust action, a simple automobile negligence
case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an environmental
class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are sufficiently
identical to be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which
makes virtually no distinctions among such cases in terms of
available process. My point is not that the Federal Rules are not
workable over such a broad range. But it may be worth asking in
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what sense that codification works well because of its transsubstantive aspiration, and in what sense it works in spite of it.118
The decades have proven Cover prescient. The success of the Federal
Rules has produced an ever-greater alienation from substantive values in
procedural analysis.
The mode of analysis set forth in this Article aims to reverse that trend.
Its prescription should be a source of comfort and reassurance to judges.
When judges confront litigation problems that are unprecedented and
intractable, they can often look to the controlling liability policies set by
politically accountable decision makers to ground their rulings and justify
the allocation of benefits and burdens that those rulings entail. When
judges must determine whether to constrain or authorize expansive and
unprecedented forms of litigation in class or mass-tort adjudication, they
can use the goals of the underlying substantive law in the disputes before
them as guideposts for their decisions. And when judges issue rulings on
open-textured procedural provisions that carry the potential for dramatic
trans-substantive effect, they can specify the manner in which the
underlying law shapes their analysis and issue holdings that are more
focused in their reasoning and more modest in their precedential impact.
The managerial judge need not feel unguided at sea. Liability policy can
provide a compass.
To return to Karl Llewellyn’s metaphor and update it for a new era, we
must learn to read trans-substantive procedure through the spectacles of
the substantive law.

118. Cover, supra note 4, at 732–33.

